[JP] Maglev: Shizuoka Approval Doesn't Guarantee Early Opening
Source: Watch Impress
Original title:
静岡の工事容認でリニア開業は見えてきたのか? リニアの歴史を振り返る
Author: Hiroo Ogawa
Date: August 26, 2026, 08:20
Original language: Japanese
Web link: https://www.watch.impress.co.jp/docs/topic/2133157.html
Accessed: August 26, 2026
The Chuo Shinkansen maglev line’s origins trace to the 1960s, when JNR began developing superconducting high-speed train concepts. Politically, early support emerged with Tanaka Kakuei’s 1972 Japan Archipelago Remodeling Theory, which advocated maglev as a "Second Tokaido Shinkansen." The name "maglev" was popularized by Kyoya Yoshitani during a 1970 lecture, when he sought a simpler term than "superconducting magnetic levitation train."
Test Lines and Development:
1977: JNR’s first external test line opened in Miyazaki Prefecture (7 km), but its length limited speeds to 400 km/h—insufficient for 500 km/h practical testing. The line also lacked curves, gradients, and tunnels needed for comprehensive safety validation. In 1987, Transport Minister Shinjiro Ishihara’s criticism of its rural setting ("chicken and pig coops") sparked controversy, but Kyoya defended the animals as natural sensors for long-term noise and vibration stress.
1989: After JNR’s 1987 privatization, JR Central inherited the project. Yamanashi was selected over Miyazaki and Hokkaido for its potential to convert the test line into a commercial route.
1996–2013: The Yamanashi test line opened in phases, ultimately reaching 42.8 km. Its double-track design enabled testing of wind pressure effects from passing trains and overtaking maneuvers, confirming intermediate station feasibility. The L0 series set a 603 km/h world record in 2015.
Route, Stations, and Shizuoka’s Opposition:
A 2011 government plan set Tokyo–Nagoya opening for 2027 and Tokyo–Osaka for 2037. The route prioritized direct connections between major cities, with intermediate stations only in populous areas, leading to maglev-only stations in Yamanashi, Nagano, and Gifu.
Shizuoka’s 8.9 km section became a major obstacle. Governor Heita Kawakatsu opposed construction due to risks to the Oigawa River, a vital water source for daily life, industry, and agriculture. His concerns stemmed from past water issues during Tokaido Shinkansen construction. Despite criticism as obstructionist, Kawakatsu’s stance reflected genuine environmental risks.
Construction Delays Beyond Shizuoka:
Gifu: Ground subsidence and well depletion confirmed in Mizuho Town.
Nagano: Tunnel blasting caused slope collapses and landslides; excess soil disposal remains unresolved.
Tokyo: Road uplift observed near Shinagawa Station.
Industry-wide: Labor shortages, soaring material costs, and yen depreciation plague the entire construction sector.
Current Status and Outlook:
Shizuoka’s approval doesn’t guarantee immediate progress. JR Central aims to announce a revised timeline within fiscal 2026, but industry challenges and unresolved issues in other sections make Tokyo–Nagoya opening no earlier than 2036 certain. With at least a decade until opening, the Tokaido Shinkansen will remain Japan’s primary Tokyo–Nagoya–Osaka artery.
Historical Context:
Kawakatsu wasn’t inherently anti-maglev. At a 2014 civil engineering symposium, he proposed partial Tokyo–Yamanashi opening before the 2020 Olympics to showcase maglev to foreign tourists, aligning with government plans to export superconducting technology.
[JP] Maglev: Shizuoka Approval Doesn't Guarantee Early Opening
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[JP] Maglev: Shizuoka Approval Doesn't Guarantee Early Opening
[JP] Maglev Construction Must Gain Regional Understanding to Reach Completion
Source: Fukui Shimbun
Original title:
リニア新幹線 地域理解得て完成目指せ
Date: September 7, 2026, 06:39
Original language: Japanese
Category: Editorial
Web link: https://www.fukuishimbun.co.jp/articles/-/2692514
Accessed: September 7, 2026
In an editorial, Fukui Shimbun notes that JR Central’s Chuo Shinkansen maglev line construction in Shizuoka—stalled for ~9 years over concerns that “[Translated quote] tunnel excavation would reduce the Oigawa River’s flow”—has finally begun. The line, connecting Tokyo–Nagoya–Osaka at ~500 km/h, has 86% tunnels, including the challenging 8.9 km Shizuoka section of the 25 km South Alps Tunnel (max depth: 1,400 m).
Governor Suzuki’s July approval followed JR Central’s environmental commitments and careful resident explanations. However, construction issues persist: groundwater depletion in Gifu’s Mizuho City halted work, and road uplift occurred in Tokyo’s Shinagawa. The editorial urges JR Central to transparently address causes and prevention.
Costs have doubled to ¥11 trillion due to material price surges and difficult terrain; Shizuoka’s section alone may take >10 years, delaying opening beyond 2036. The prolonged stagnation has impacted Nagoya and other cities banking on maglev-led development. With the Nagoya–Osaka section’s start date undecided, the editorial calls for steady progress while securing local understanding, as the project promises significant economic benefits through drastically reduced travel times.
Source: Fukui Shimbun
Original title:
リニア新幹線 地域理解得て完成目指せ
Date: September 7, 2026, 06:39
Original language: Japanese
Category: Editorial
Web link: https://www.fukuishimbun.co.jp/articles/-/2692514
Accessed: September 7, 2026
In an editorial, Fukui Shimbun notes that JR Central’s Chuo Shinkansen maglev line construction in Shizuoka—stalled for ~9 years over concerns that “[Translated quote] tunnel excavation would reduce the Oigawa River’s flow”—has finally begun. The line, connecting Tokyo–Nagoya–Osaka at ~500 km/h, has 86% tunnels, including the challenging 8.9 km Shizuoka section of the 25 km South Alps Tunnel (max depth: 1,400 m).
Governor Suzuki’s July approval followed JR Central’s environmental commitments and careful resident explanations. However, construction issues persist: groundwater depletion in Gifu’s Mizuho City halted work, and road uplift occurred in Tokyo’s Shinagawa. The editorial urges JR Central to transparently address causes and prevention.
Costs have doubled to ¥11 trillion due to material price surges and difficult terrain; Shizuoka’s section alone may take >10 years, delaying opening beyond 2036. The prolonged stagnation has impacted Nagoya and other cities banking on maglev-led development. With the Nagoya–Osaka section’s start date undecided, the editorial calls for steady progress while securing local understanding, as the project promises significant economic benefits through drastically reduced travel times.
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Re: [JP] Shizuoka Section Restart Doesn't Solve Maglev's Three Major Risks
[JP] Opinion: Shizuoka Section Restart Doesn't Solve Maglev's Three Major Risks
Source: President.jp
Original title:
静岡工区だけが遅延の原因ではない…リニア計画に残る3つの重大リスク
Subtitle:
工費は倍の約11兆円 それでも掘り続けるのか
Original language: Japanese
Web link: https://president.jp/articles/-/118733 The full article is behind a paywall.
Accessed: September 8, 2026
Context: The article is an opinion piece, not a neutral project assessment.
The article by Ken’ichi Ōmae takes a critical view of the continued construction of the Chūō Shinkansen maglev line. Some progress has been made on the section in Shizuoka Prefecture, which had been stalled since 2017: Following the resignation of former Governor Heita Kawakatsu in 2024, his successor, Yasutomo Suzuki, has taken a more accommodating position. On July 18, 2026, an agreement to protect the natural environment was signed, and geological exploration drilling resumed on August 21. However, the actual tunnel construction work has not yet begun.
The central argument is that restarting work in Shizuoka does not resolve the project’s fundamental problems. The delays are not attributable solely to the dispute over the Ōi River and the potential impact on its flow. Rather, the project as a whole continues to face several serious risks. The author therefore suggests that JR Central should consider withdrawing from the project before further irreversible decisions and investments are made.
The Three Risks
The publicly accessible portion of the article does not explain the three risks in full detail. However, the headline and context point to the following problem areas:
Further delays: Outside Shizuoka, the project also faces difficult tunneling sections, technical challenges, and the need to coordinate with local governments and residents. The resumption of exploratory drilling therefore does not mean that the overall construction schedule is secure.
Sharp increases in construction costs: The projected cost of the Shinagawa–Nagoya section is said to have doubled to approximately ¥11 trillion. This intensifies the question of whether the project’s economic benefits are still proportionate to the required investment.
Limited construction capacity and labor shortages: A project of this scale and technical complexity requires specialized engineers, tunnel workers, and construction firms. Competition for labor and other resources may make it difficult to build several sections simultaneously.
The Author’s Assessment
Ōmae presents the project not merely as a delayed infrastructure undertaking, but as a strategic investment risk. Even if the conflict in Shizuoka is eased, cost increases, limited resources, and further delays will remain. The political and symbolic importance of the maglev project, he argues, should not obscure the possibility that JR Central may have reached a point at which abandoning the project would make more economic sense than continuing it.
Source: President.jp
Original title:
静岡工区だけが遅延の原因ではない…リニア計画に残る3つの重大リスク
Subtitle:
工費は倍の約11兆円 それでも掘り続けるのか
Original language: Japanese
Web link: https://president.jp/articles/-/118733 The full article is behind a paywall.
Accessed: September 8, 2026
Context: The article is an opinion piece, not a neutral project assessment.
The article by Ken’ichi Ōmae takes a critical view of the continued construction of the Chūō Shinkansen maglev line. Some progress has been made on the section in Shizuoka Prefecture, which had been stalled since 2017: Following the resignation of former Governor Heita Kawakatsu in 2024, his successor, Yasutomo Suzuki, has taken a more accommodating position. On July 18, 2026, an agreement to protect the natural environment was signed, and geological exploration drilling resumed on August 21. However, the actual tunnel construction work has not yet begun.
The central argument is that restarting work in Shizuoka does not resolve the project’s fundamental problems. The delays are not attributable solely to the dispute over the Ōi River and the potential impact on its flow. Rather, the project as a whole continues to face several serious risks. The author therefore suggests that JR Central should consider withdrawing from the project before further irreversible decisions and investments are made.
The Three Risks
The publicly accessible portion of the article does not explain the three risks in full detail. However, the headline and context point to the following problem areas:
Further delays: Outside Shizuoka, the project also faces difficult tunneling sections, technical challenges, and the need to coordinate with local governments and residents. The resumption of exploratory drilling therefore does not mean that the overall construction schedule is secure.
Sharp increases in construction costs: The projected cost of the Shinagawa–Nagoya section is said to have doubled to approximately ¥11 trillion. This intensifies the question of whether the project’s economic benefits are still proportionate to the required investment.
Limited construction capacity and labor shortages: A project of this scale and technical complexity requires specialized engineers, tunnel workers, and construction firms. Competition for labor and other resources may make it difficult to build several sections simultaneously.
The Author’s Assessment
Ōmae presents the project not merely as a delayed infrastructure undertaking, but as a strategic investment risk. Even if the conflict in Shizuoka is eased, cost increases, limited resources, and further delays will remain. The political and symbolic importance of the maglev project, he argues, should not obscure the possibility that JR Central may have reached a point at which abandoning the project would make more economic sense than continuing it.